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Political parties are central institutions of most modern democracies. Many citizens ascribe moral 
importance to supporting a party and trust it while mistrusting its opponents. These ethical and 
epistemic forms of partisanship are sometimes criticized as thoughtless ways of acting and forming 
beliefs.1 This essay explains why partisanship is justified in contemporary America and environments 
with similar voting systems and coalition structures. 
 
Section 1 discusses how political parties operate. The makeup of party coalitions explains their 
candidates, policies, and ideologies, largely through primaries. Section 2 explains how helping a party 
succeed can have genuine ethical significance. If parties are the best vehicles for affecting policy, the 
importance of instituting better policies makes the better party's victory important. Section 3 explains 
how trusting one party and mistrusting another can be a reliable way to form true beliefs. If 
sociological factors that promote bias are heavily concentrated in one party coalition, its media will be 
less reliable, while the opposing party's media may exceed the reliability of nonpartisan media. Section 
4 applies these arguments to contemporary political systems. 
 
1. How American political parties work 
The nature of each political party is determined by the coalition of voters, interest groups, and media 
organizations animating it. These groups' activities explain what parties do, which ideology they have, 
and how they compete in elections.  
 
A narrower construal of parties might focus on institutions with "Democratic" and "Republican" in their 
names and the politicians officially affiliated with them. But the operations of these institutions don't 
explain which candidates the parties nominate, which policies they support, and how they strive 
against each other in general elections. A variety of other institutions, described as "party actors" by 
political scientists like Cohen et al (2009), make up party coalitions and determine what the parties do. 
Party actors in the Republican coalition include anti-abortion groups, the National Rifle Association, 
and Fox News. Mirroring them on the Democratic side are labor unions, Emily's List, and media 
figures like Rachel Maddow and Stephen Colbert. Wall Street is an influential actor in both parties 
because of its enormous wealth. 
 
Party actors such as labor unions and feminist groups are integrated into Democratic campaigns and 
influence whom the party nominates. At a fundraiser in Oregon, I saw a speaker pass around a pie 
chart of outside groups that had provided organized volunteer support for Democrats in the last 
gubernatorial election. Nearly half of the support came from labor unions, nearly half came from 
feminist groups, and the rest came from the League of Conservation Voters. Influential donors and 
politicians recognized these groups' role in the party. They gain influence from such recognition. 
Democratic candidates court them, since their ability to mobilize supporters helps in winning elections. 
Party actors have many goals beyond partisan politics, and their self-conception need not be as partisan 
organizations. But they affect electoral politics by supporting candidates who promote their interests. 
Anti-abortion groups, the National Rifle Association, and the broad coalition of conservative 
organizations called the Tea Party play a similar role on the Republican side.  
 
Fox News is a party actor of another sort. As a news channel promoting Republican views, it transmits 
ideas from party elites to ordinary voters. This gives Republican voters strategies for how to achieve 
ideological goals -- for example, contacting their representatives about developments in Congress or by 
voting for particular candidates in primaries. By telling viewers that Democrats have done outrageous 
things, it motivates them to vote for Republicans and donate to Republican candidates. The Onion 
subtly plays a similar role with Democrats. While its satirical format prevents it from being explicitly 
partisan, sophisticated media observers note its effectiveness in communicating left-wing political 
                                                            




The power of these party actors is quite fluid, and they can struggle with each other to control a party. 
White supremacists who openly supported segregation were significant Democratic Party actors before 
the Civil Rights Act, but their influence has collapsed with the progress of racial equality. Supporters 
and opponents of trade agreements, immigration restrictions, financial industry regulation, and war 
contend with each other for influence within major parties. Before the reforms of 1972, party insiders 
worked all this out in the proverbial smoke-filled rooms. But as Cohen et al (2009) write in discussing 
presidential nominations, "that system is a far cry from the one that exists today... Today, in contrast, 
the voting public chooses almost all of the delegates to the national party nominating conventions. 
They do so by means of state-by-state primary elections and caucuses in which candidates win 
delegates in rough proportion to the popular vote for them in that state" (1-2). The same holds for lower 
offices. 
 
Party actors' influence is ultimately determined by their ability to help candidates win. Some, like Fox 
News and any issue-oriented group with an email list, wield influence by communicating with voters. 
Others provide campaign contributions. Either way, candidates have incentives to seek their favor. 
Party actors gain and lose influence with candidates as they gain and lose influence over voters.  
 
My discussion of parties excludes minor parties, as they're very different institutions from major 
parties. In America's two-party system, minor-party and independent candidacies are similar. After 
losing his primary in 2006, Joe Lieberman started a new party called "Connecticut for Lieberman" and 
ran as its nominee. He won the general election only because the Republican nominee's gambling 
addiction had gotten him thrown out of casinos, leaving many Republicans open to voting for him. 
Connecticut for Lieberman isn't like major parties. It didn't have meaningful primaries, won only 
because the Republican was a gambling addict, and didn't outlive its candidate. Like most minor-party 
and independent candidates, Lieberman's success required prior fame and strange circumstances.3  
 
Bernie Sanders' 2006 election to the Senate as an independent Socialist in Vermont had its own special 
circumstances. Explicitly supported by the state and national Democratic leadership, Sanders was 
functionally a Democratic candidate. He voted like one before and after his victory.4 While the Green 
and Libertarian parties sometimes have competitive primaries, only the thinnest permanent coalitions 
of party actors and voters surround them. Given the stark differences between major and minor parties, 
partisanship in this essay will only involve supporting major parties. I'll treat supporting a minor party 
as equivalent to nonpartisanship.  
 
Party coalitions explain the parties' distinctive combinations of issue positions. The Republican Party is 
largely a coalition of white evangelical Christians and wealthy people and businesses. The fact that 
wealthy Southerners are often white evangelicals helps to unify this coalition. The Democratic coalition 
brings together diverse groups whose favored policies conflict with those of the Republican coalition. 
This is why Jews, African-Americans, gays and lesbians, supporters of abortion rights, labor unions, 
and environmentalists are all firmly Democratic despite their demographic differences. 
 
%Obama - %GOP nominee in exit poll5 2008 2012 
Jews 78-21 69-30 
African-Americans 95-4 93-6 
Gay / Lesbian / Bisexual 70-27 76-22 
Union households 59-39 58-40 
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White evangelicals 24-74 21-78 
National popular vote 53-46 51-47 
 
The social conservatism supported by the dominant strand of American Christianity forbids gay 
marriage and abortion, and worries many Jews who remember how politically dominant 
ethnoreligious groups killed their ancestors. Fervent black support for Democrats comes from class and 
racial divisions that began with slavery. Despite their seemingly unrelated concerns, labor unions and 
environmentalists unite against businesses whose pursuit of profit conflicts with workers' interests and 
the environment. 
 
Partisans recognize these coalitions, supporting their coalition partners and acting spitefully against 
opposing coalition members. Democrats have warm feelings towards the poor, blacks, Hispanics, 
working class, and union members; while Republicans feel close to businesspeople.6 Negative attitudes 
towards opposing coalition members are also common.7 Republicans who lacked previous signs of pro-
environmental sentiment increased their home energy usage after receiving reports on it and how it 
could be reduced, and Rush Limbaugh told his listeners to waste energy during Earth Hour to spite 
environmentalists.8 
 
Coalition politics, not ideology, unifies parties. While party ideologies certainly differ, coalition politics 
better explains party ideology than vice versa. The simple equations of "Republicans=the wealthy + 
white evangelicals; Democrats=opponents of Republicans" explains why Republicans offer libertarian 
arguments against taxation but resist libertarian arguments for abortion rights, and Democrats do the 
opposite. The wealthy fear progressive taxation, while white evangelicals oppose abortion rights. 
Broad political ideologies like libertarianism are only selectively accepted by the parties, as coalition 
politics requires. The demand for ideological consistency on issues that don't stand in immediate 
practical conflict (like taxation and abortion) comes mainly from a group weakly represented in both 
coalitions: intellectuals who care about consistency.  
 
After coalitions come together, ideology develops around them. Consistent opposition to government 
power wouldn't serve either party's interests, so neither party has such an ideology. Republican 
ideology combines white evangelicals' favored social policies with economic royalism. Democratic 
ideology combines tolerant social views favorable to its diverse coalition with mild redistributionism. If 
academics tend to support Democrats, that may be because abstract theorizing often doesn't match the 
intricacies of dominant ethnoreligious groups' idiosyncratic views. In any case, party ideology is 
explained from the coalition members' interests up, rather than from philosophy down.  
 
Republican views of abortion, contraception, homosexuality, and generous financial assistance for 
single mothers display how parties' favored policies arise from their members' antecedent views rather 
than being derived from abstract considerations. Opposition to abortion is usually expressed in terms 
of concern for fetal life. This might make anti-abortion views seem harmonious with government 
support for contraception, tolerance for homosexuality, and generous assistance for single mothers. 
Contraception prevents unplanned pregnancies and abortions, homosexual sex can't result in abortion, 
and financially assisting single mothers reduces economic incentives to have abortions. But the 
Republican Party opposes free contraception, homosexuality, and generous financial assistance for 
single mothers along with abortion. Conservative Christians' ideal of sexual abstinence until 
heterosexual marriage explains all of this. Abortion, contraception, homosexuality, and single 
motherhood are condemned as departures from this ideal. Since the wealthy oppose redistribution, 
they join evangelicals in opposing financial assistance for single mothers and raise the specter of such 
assistance in attacking other redistributive programs. 
                                                            
6 Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler (2002) Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social 
Identities of Voters. Yale University Press. 
7 Jennifer Emery (2008) Finding Common Enemies: Social Groups as Shortcuts to Partisanship, Dissertation, SUNY-
Binghamton. 
8 Dora Costa and Matthew E. Kahn (2010) "Energy Conservation" National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper.  
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It may seem surprising that anything general could be said about the ethical and epistemic significance 
of such philosophically ungainly institutions as political parties. But people are complicated too, and 
sometimes it's right to trust one instead of another. When a political system gives us two parties to 
choose from, we may be right to trust one and mistrust its rival. 
 
2. Ethical partisanship: support major parties and use primaries to steer them 
This section presents a simple ethical justification for partisan action. As I'll assume, it's important to 
improve public policy on the issues at stake in electoral politics. And as I'll argue, the best way to 
achieve this important goal is by supporting the better party and by improving the parties' policies 
through primaries. So that's what we should do. I'll explain why supporting the better major party is 
the best strategy in general elections. Then I'll describe how primaries allow voters to improve the 
major parties. 
 
My defense of partisanship focuses on electoral politics. It doesn't address many valuable activities that 
could change society without involving government policy, which fall outside electoral politics and 
need not be pursued in a partisan way. Examples include reducing prejudice against disadvantaged 
groups and changing social institutions that aren't governments. I'll also set aside government activities 
themselves, like criminal trials and military campaigns. I'll also set aside efforts to popularize an idea 
with the hope that it'll eventually be implemented by policymakers, if no electoral means to that end 
are specified. But this leaves many important issues within electoral politics. Social services, taxation, 
criminal justice, civil rights, nuclear nonproliferation, immigration, and war are all matters of 
government policy that have massive effects on people's lives, and over which the electoral system has 
ultimate control.  
 
This section won't assume that either party has the right answers on any substantive question of public 
policy. I'll instead assume that you have the right answers. Whatever these answers may be, acting 
through the major parties is the best way for you to translate them into policy. Even if the parties favor 
deeply flawed policies, primaries let you democratically change their policy commitments. Then you 
can support a major party with the right policies in a general election. Of course, if your favored 
policies would be disastrous, my advice will help you cause disaster. It's good if people with disastrous 
views leave electoral politics, or better yet, pursue counterproductive means. But the optimal political 
agent will combine excellent policy preferences with effective means. In contemporary America and 
similar systems, these means involve using the major parties as vehicles of political change.  
 
America has two major political parties because of how its elections are structured: each voter votes for 
one candidate, and the candidate with the most votes wins. This system can reject the most popular 
policy merely because multiple candidates support it. Suppose policy A is more popular than policy B 
by a 60%-40% margin. Then the democratic process should deliver policy A. But if two similar 
candidates support A, and only one candidate supports B, a 30%-30% split between the A-supporting 
candidates lets the B-supporting candidate win with 40%. The coalition favoring A can avoid losing 
this way by establishing a party and having a primary. The winner gains the party's nomination for the 
general election and the loser withdraws. This concentrates votes for A on one candidate. Political 
scientists call the principle that plurality-vote systems become two-party systems "Duverger's Law".9 
 
Running for office outside a major party risks dividing the pool of voters who support one's favored 
policies, delivering victory to one's least favorite major-party candidate. The classic example is Ralph 
Nader's 2000 Green Party presidential campaign. Al Gore would've won if just 1% of the 97,488 Nader 
voters in Florida had instead voted for him, overcoming George W. Bush's 537-vote margin of victory 
in the state. Bush went on to invade Iraq, cut taxes on the rich, appoint right-wing Supreme Court 
justices, and do many other things likely to make Nader voters wish that Gore had won instead.  
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The counterproductive nature of minor parties is well-understood by political tacticians. The $66,000 
donated to Pennsylvania Green Party Senate candidate Carl Romanelli came entirely from Republican 
sources, except for $30 from the candidate himself.10 $40,000 came from identifiable supporters of 
Romanelli's Republican opponent Rick Santorum, or from their housemates. Romanelli received 99.95% 
of his funding from Republicans who hoped that he would cut into the Democratic share of the vote. 
Knowing how counterproductive minor parties are, hard-nosed tacticians among their ideological 
opponents coordinate funding schemes to prop them up. 
 
Trying to get a major party to support a policy by voting for a minor party endorsing that policy is 
similarly ineffective. The major party may instead concede that policy's supporters to the minor party, 
and seek other ways to make up the lost votes. This is especially likely when the minor party is further 
from the center than the major party. If Democrats move right and win over a Republican voter, they 
gain a vote while the Republicans lose a vote. But if Democrats move left and win over a Green voter, 
they gain a vote without reducing the Republican total. So as long as Greens have less support than 
Republicans, winning Republican votes is twice as good as winning Green votes. Nader's pivotal role 
in 2000 certainly didn't create a left-wing resurgence within the Democratic Party. Two years later, 22 
Democratic Senators voted for the Iraq War.  
 
If your favored policies don't have major-party support, working through primaries is the way to get 
support for them. This strategy has firm mathematical foundations and has been used by Tea Party 
groups to control the Republican Party. Far from permitting only two options, the two-party system 
allows many different options in primaries, and democratically selects two of the most popular ones for 
the general election. 
 
Primaries make parties responsive to new ideas. Suppose 30% of voters favor policy X, 30% favor 
policy Y, and 40% favor policy Z. Even if one major party has historically favored X and the other has 
favored Y, Z-supporters can change this by voting in one of the two existing parties' primaries. Since 
their numbers exceed those of any party's previous supporters, they can carry a candidate who favors 
Z to victory in either party's primary. Old party actors are likely to struggle against the Z-supporters 
for control of the party. But Z-supporters are positioned to win this struggle. Modern primaries are 
decided at the ballot box, allowing greater popular support for Z to lead its candidate to victory.  
 
Primaries make it easier to take over an existing party than to win with a new one. Winning three-way 
general elections requires at least a third of the voters. 34% will win if the opponents are divided at 33% 
and 33%, but usually the opposition won't be so neatly divided and more than 34% will be needed. But 
over a third of the electorate is always enough voters to take over one of the two major parties and win 
its nomination. If over a third of the population supports a policy, it's mathematically impossible for 
both major parties to consist of more than a third of the population entirely opposing the policy. So 
ideas with enough democratic support to win three-way general elections will always have enough 
support to enter and win a major-party primary.  
 
The success of the Tea Party shows how primaries can democratically transform parties. Unhappy with 
Republican leaders for compromising with Democrats, Tea Party groups supported conservative 
candidates in Republican primaries against mainstream candidates favored by the party establishment. 
Senators whose Tea Party support helped them defeat established mainstream Republicans include Ted 
Cruz, who defeated former Texas Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst; Marco Rubio, who defeated 
former Florida Governor Charlie Crist; and Mike Lee, who defeated longtime Utah Senator Bob 
Bennett. Many other Tea Party candidates won Republican Senate primaries against strong mainstream 
candidates only to lose general elections to Democrats. By my count, Tea Party candidates defeated 
moderate Republicans in primaries but lost general elections a total of 7 times in the 2010 and 2012 
Senate elections.11  
                                                            
10 Daryl Nerl (2006) "Republican Bankroll Taints Green Party Hopefuls", Morning Call; Paul Kiel (2006) "GOP Donors 
Funded Entire PA Green Party Drive", TalkingPointsMemo. 
11 Neil Sinhababu (2012), "Senate Republicans' Primary Problem", Donkeylicious. 
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The Tea Party used its success in primaries to steer the Republican Party. Political scientist Dave 
Hopkins notes that "Most Republican senators are more worried about losing a primary election than a 
general election, and their behavior is understandable given these electoral incentives."12 Bennett lost his 
primary partly for co-sponsoring Democrat Ron Wyden's health care bill. Richard Lugar lost the 
Indiana Republican primary largely for co-sponsoring successful nuclear nonproliferation legislation 
with Barack Obama and supporting his judicial nominees. The threat of losing primaries makes 
Republican legislators afraid to cooperate with Democrats, just as the Tea Party desires. The Tea Party 
demonstrates control over a party can be acquired through primaries, even if it sometimes uses its 
control so aggressively as to be counterproductive. 
 
Working through the parties need not involve individually acting through official party organizations 
or knowing much about the details of elections. Partisanship can instead involve supporting an 
organization that works through official party organizations and has such knowledge. Emily's List 
donates to pro-choice women. Most of this money goes to Democratic candidates, since pro-choice 
female candidates are usually Democrats. Even if some of these donors don't see themselves as 
supporting the Democratic Party, their donations promote their ideological goals by helping it succeed. 
Likewise, these donors' contributions also help pro-choice female candidates win Democratic 
primaries, whether they can identify the candidates or not.  
 
Individuals can also let more knowledgeable party actors act through them. On Election Day 2004 in 
Detroit, I saw African-American voters requesting voter guides made by local activist groups. 
Determining how to vote in all the different elections on the ballot takes time and effort, so these voters 
quite reasonably delegated that work to community activists whom they trusted. My arguments apply 
more directly to groups like Emily's List and the community activists. If their strategy is to vote for 
major parties in general elections and steer them using the primary system, they're choosing the right 
means to their ends. If donors and voters affiliate themselves with organizations which choose these 
means, they're also making the right choices. 
 
Opponents of the two-party system might argue for withholding support even from the better party, in 
order to undermine the two-party system and eventually create a better system. Some institutions can 
be undermined in analogous ways. If you want to help in undermining the cola industry, you might 
abstain from buying Pepsi or Coke, even if you prefer one to the other. If most people did so, the cola 
industry would collapse. So can you help in undermining the two-party system simply by not voting or 
doing anything to support either party? 
 
The zero-sum nature of political competition prevents nonparticipation from undermining the two-
party system. Even if most people didn't participate, a major-party candidate would still win, giving 
one party coalition the outcome it wanted. Unlike the cola industry, where Pepsi and Coke care about 
their own profits and don't especially care to exceed the other's profits, each party cares less about its 
raw vote total than about exceeding the other. Winning or losing 5,000,000 to 4,500,000 is no different 
from winning or losing 5,000 to 4,500. So massive nonparticipation is no threat to the two-party system. 
If one thinks instead of voting for a third party, one faces the Duverger's Law argument discussed 
earlier in this section. The structure of American elections compresses political coalitions into two 
parties, so that multiple similar candidates don't divide a majority and cause its defeat. 
 
Ending the two-party system requires changing America's voting structure. Instead of having everyone 
vote for one candidate and letting the candidate with most votes win, one might institute Instant 
Runoff Voting. My arguments might not apply to such a system, depending on the details. Those 
interested in ending the two-party system should explore such options.  
 
3. Epistemic partisanship: when partisan news sources are more reliable 
The case for epistemic partisanship is as simple as the case for ethical partisanship. As I'll assume, we 
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should trust news sources that reliably produce true belief.13 And as I'll argue, the structure of American 
political coalitions and media suggests that the most reliable sources of true belief on public policy 
issues will be concentrated within one party's media infrastructure. So we should trust these partisan 
news sources. I'll consider the question of whether Iraq had WMD as a case study of how one party's 
partisan media can exhibit superior reliability.  
 
As the first section of this paper describes, partisan news sources aren't limited to official party 
institutions. Fox News is a partisan source, almost as much as the Republican National Committee. To 
not regard people who trust Bill O'Reilly and Sean Hannity as Republican epistemic partisans just 
because Fox isn't legally owned by the Republican Party would be a mistake. Other partisan sources on 
the Republican side include talk radio hosts like Mark Levin and Rush Limbaugh. Democratic partisan 
news sources include TV hosts like Rachel Maddow, John Oliver, and Stephen Colbert. Both sides have 
a large network of partisan social media groups and blogs. While many major newspapers are 
nonpartisan news sources, they also create a limited zone for partisan media on their opinion pages.  
 
Since partisan sources promote an excessively favorable view of their party and an excessively 
unfavorable view of the opposing party, one might wonder how partisan media could be more reliable 
than nonpartisan media. Political parties are interested parties when it comes to information that could 
affect our votes, giving their media outlets incentives to mislead us. In some environments, this will 
indeed make nonpartisan media sources more reliable than partisan ones.  
 
In other environments, nonpartisan media may have a centrist bias that prevents it from getting to the 
truth, making one party's media more reliable. Of course, the opposing party's media is then likely to 
be very unreliable. I won't argue that partisan media is generally more reliable. Instead, I'll explain how 
one party's media could provide the most reliable sources. 
 
As I'll explain, partisan media is likely to contain especially reliable and especially unreliable sources of 
information, because it ties itself tightly to some sources while disconnecting itself from others. When 
sources of information favor the party's interests, its media will amplify their statements and defend 
their credibility, while the opposing party's media will ignore them or attack their credibility. Media 
outlets defending the credibility of sources will trust them in the future and convince their viewers to 
do so. Attacking a source's credibility has the opposite effects. Over time, this will lead opposing 
parties to trust very different sources. Parties trusting reliable sources will have highly reliable partisan 
media, and parties trusting unreliable sources will have highly unreliable partisan media. A party that 
ties itself to a mix of highly reliable and highly unreliable sources will have a partisan media that 
sharply varies in reliability. 
 
Climate scientists and Christian religious leaders are sources of this kind. While environmentalists in 
the Democratic coalition regard climate science as providing useful information about environmental 
outcomes, it threatens the profits of oil companies in the Republican coalition. So while Democratic 
media respects climate scientists, Republican media attacks their credibility. The reverse is true with 
Christian religious leaders, who are respected by the Republican Party's religious base but whose 
opposition to feminism and homosexuality earns Democrats' enmity. Republican media respects them; 
Democratic media mocks them. If climate science is reliable, Democratic media will be right about 
climate-related issues while Republican media will be systematically mistaken. And if Christian 
religious leaders are especially reliable, Republican media will have a spectacular source of guidance 
that Democrats ignore.  
 
The coalition structure of American politics explains how more reliable sources of true belief might be 
concentrated in one party's media, with less reliable sources concentrated in the other. The Republican 
coalition consists mainly of white evangelicals and wealthy people and businesses. The Democratic 
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Party is a diverse collection of groups whose policy preferences conflict with those of Republicans. If 
beliefs favoring the distinctive policy preferences of white evangelicals or of wealthy interests are 
especially likely to be true, Republican media will be more reliable. But if these groups' distinctive 
policy preferences result from biases that less diverse and wealthy coalitions avoid, Democratic media 
will be more reliable. I'll focus on the two groups making up the Republican coalition in explaining 
this. 
 
While Republican media supports policies favored by white evangelical Christians, the diversity of the 
Democratic coalition prevents the idiosyncratic views of any one group from dominating its ideology. 
Instead, it promotes a broadly egalitarian ideology congenial to its black, feminist, Jewish, and LGBT 
supporters' interests. Self-aggrandizing or idiosyncratic views within these groups aren't emphasized 
within Democratic media, to avoid alienating coalition partners. Presenting blacks as superior to whites 
would alienate white lesbians, and presenting lesbians as superior to heterosexuals would alienate 
black heterosexuals. So Democratic media promotes ideals of equality that a diverse coalition can agree 
on.  
 
Each party defends the reliability of sources of information promoting its favored policies, and attacks 
the reliability of contrary sources. So if something special about white evangelicals explains the 
reliability of the sources that favor their policies -- for example, if divine revelation gives them good 
information -- Republican media will be more reliable. But if their distinctive views result from the 
sorts of biases that are smoothed out by the demands of maintaining a diverse coalition, Democratic 
media will be more reliable.  
 
Economic issues work similarly. If ideas favoring the wealthy are generally right, Republican media 
will be more reliable. But if society is biased in favor of the wealthy because wealth helps them 
promote dubious ideas favoring their interests, Democratic media will be more reliable. Since wealth 
provides influence within both parties, Democratic media may itself be biased in favor of the wealthy, 
though less so than Republican media. Whether society is unduly biased in favor of wealth or against it 
will thus affect which party's media is more biased.  
 
So whether Democratic or Republican media is systematically more reliable comes down to two 
questions. Are beliefs supporting white evangelicals' favored policies more or less likely to be true than 
beliefs supporting a diverse coalition's opposition to these policies? And are beliefs supporting the 
favored policies of the wealthy more or less likely to be true than beliefs supporting a broad coalition's 
opposition to these policies? If the answer to both questions is "more", Republican media will be more 
reliable. If the answer to both questions is "less", Democratic media will be more reliable. The answers 
may differ, making one party more reliable on one cluster of issues but not on another. But there's a 
near-50% chance of the answers lining up (assuming the independence of the questions), making one 
party's media more reliable than the other on a broad range of issues.  
 
Nonpartisan media has its own biases. Broadcast news networks, national magazines, and major 
newspapers seek to appeal to an audience that spans both parties. Broader audiences provide greater 
advertising revenue, biasing nonpartisan sources to stand in the center of their potential audience, with 
special care to flatter the most widely held views. They may focus especially on appealing to the 
wealthy, since advertisers will pay more to communicate with an audience that can spend more money 
on their products. Even if nonpartisan journalists can easily discover facts refuting a popular ideology, 
their management must be careful not to alienate its supporters and especially the wealthy. These facts 
will emerge more clearly in the media of a party opposing that ideology.  
 
Nonpartisan media isn't non-ideological. Instead, it combines the ideology of the social and economic 
forces controlling it with the ideologies that help it meet its organizational goals -- usually, maximizing 
profits by maintaining a broad and wealthy audience. Absorbing a broad range of popular ideologies 
may promote its reliability, if this prevents any group's idiosyncratic or self-aggrandizing views from 
wholly capturing it. But when one such view dominates society, it's likely to also dominate nonpartisan 
media. So nonpartisan media will usually provide news that promotes the interests of many powerful 
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ideologies, especially those with popular support or economic control over it.  
 
This defense of the greater reliability of some partisan media applies only to public policy issues. 
Nonpartisan media is likely to be more reliable on other questions, such as politicians' personal 
scandals. Partisan incentives to defend allies and attack enemies are merely biases in these cases. 
There's no obvious reason why one party's politicians would be more scandal-prone than the other, or 
why one party's media would be more fair-minded.  
 
The question of whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction provides the best case study in how 
partisan sources can be more reliable than nonpartisan ones on public policy issues. Obviously there 
are many cases available for assessing the reliability of various types of media. But the issue of whether 
Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear and biological weapons which could kill 
people by the millions, stands out as a good test case. First, it concerns a public policy issue rather than 
a personal scandal. Second, it's a simple and narrow factual question to which the answer has been 
demonstrated. Third, media institutions of all kinds had time to deliberate about whether Iraq had 
WMD, making their results a genuine sign of their nature. Fourth, this question had political 
significance unequalled by any similarly narrow factual question in American politics over the last four 
decades. Widespread false belief that Iraq had WMD led the US to start a war that cost trillions of 
dollars, thousands of American lives, and hundreds of thousands of foreign lives.14 No question of 
public policy in my lifetime with such a simple factual answer was discussed so long and proved so 
significant.  
 
With President Bush enjoying massive public support after the 9/11 attack, nonpartisan media heeded 
administration warnings that the "smoking gun" for Iraq having WMD might take the form of a 
"mushroom cloud". Bush speechwriter Michael Gerson suggested these phrases in a September 5, 2002 
meeting, and they were later used publicly by Condoleezza Rice.15 Media outlets casting doubt on these 
warnings would alienate supporters of a popular president. This came through most clearly in the 
media treatment of UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, whose investigations into Iraq weren't revealing 














from op-ed writers to the 2004 comedy Team America: World Police.17  
 
New York Times reporter Judith Miller was foremost in convincing America that Iraq had WMD, with a 
series of stories passing along false testimony from supposed defectors and dissidents. One of her 
sources claimed "to have done repair or construction work in facilities that were connected with all 
three classes of unconventional weapons: nuclear, chemical, and biological programs."18 Another 
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pseudonymous source claimed that "All of Iraq is one large storage facility" and that the Iraqi arsenal 
included "12,500 gallons of anthrax, 2,500 gallons of gas gangrene, 1,250 gallons of aflotoxin and 2,000 
gallons of botulinum" as well as 5 tons of VX gas.19 An anonymous source claimed that a Russian 
scientist had given Iraq a "particularly virulent strain of smallpox."20 As Jack Shafer writes, "Miller, more 
than any other reporter, showcased the WMD speculations and intelligence findings by the Bush 
administration and the Iraqi defector/dissidents. Our WMD expectations, such as they were, grew 
largely out of Miller's stories."21 As the invasion began, Miller went to Iraq with a US military team 
seeking the weapons of mass destruction, and wrote several more stories describing new WMD 
evidence.22 All this evidence proved false. 
 
Republican media firmly supported Bush, his WMD claims, and the war. The image of a manly, plain-
spoken Texan protecting America against Arab Muslims helped Bush consolidate white evangelical 
support. Republican columnists described Bush's decision to invade Iraq with poker metaphors, 
explicitly connecting them to his Texas background.23 Republican attacks on the credibility of war 
opponents, including European WMD skeptics, provided a perfect foil for this image of Bush. One 
right-wing blogger wrote: 
 
Now I don’t know what the hell is up with the Europeans, but I can’t help but compare them to 
International Ice Skating Judges. They try to give the appearance of straight-laced professionals 
interested in fair play and sportsmanship, but you know they’re just a bunch of hucksters on the 
take. And why are European bureaucrats the worst liars?24 
 
This attitude ran to the top of the Republican Party, where Bush Administration officials disregarded 
Blix's reports. The media of a party dominated by white evangelicals frequently conflated the Arab 
Muslims of the Ba'ath Party with those of al-Qaeda, so that attacking Saddam Hussein could avenge 
the crimes of Osama Bin Laden. Laurie Mylroie's fanciful claims that Hussein was responsible for the 
9/11 attacks made her a favorite on Fox News.25  
 
Skepticism about WMD found a home only in Democratic media. At that time, no left-wing 
counterpart to Fox News had emerged. So the core of Democratic partisan media became a network of 
blogs such as Daily Kos (named for its founder, Markos Moulitsas). Moulitsas and other bloggers 
criticized the supposed WMD evidence, noting for example that an Iraqi plane described by Colin 
Powell as able to launch chemical attacks on America was made of balsa wood and duct tape, and had 
a maximum range of five miles.26 Many of them drew the correct conclusions from Blix's inability to find 
WMD.27 In December 2002, Moulitsas wrote of the Bush administration, "I don't believe they have any 
evidence. Otherwise, what better way to rally world support than to prove once and for all to everyone 
that Iraq was lying? Give the inspectors the name of just ONE facility suspected of having WMD, have 
the inspectors swoop in, find the evidence, and reveal it to the world." Fellow Democratic blogger 
Duncan Black drew similar conclusions in a post titled "Blix Says Powell Lying".28 Satirical articles by 
The Onion contrasted this lack of evidence with the plentiful evidence for North Korean WMD.29 They 
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expressed this skepticism before the invasion, when policymakers could've avoided war, and before 
military investigations proved them right.  
 
No single example could conclusively demonstrate the greater reliability of more diverse and less 
wealthy coalitions. But the question of whether Iraq had WMD is the best individual test of reliability 
in recent American history, as it's a simple and settled factual question of immense policy significance 
where everyone had months to deliberate. It nicely illustrates how differences in coalition structure 
give rise to differences in the transmission of reliable information. While a diverse party learned the 
truth from foreign experts, nonpartisan media mocked them. Charles Krauthammer provides a final 
word on the reliability of parties whose ethnoreligious biases prevent them from learning from 
foreigners. In May 2003 with no WMD in sight, he counseled fellow Republicans to be patient: "Hans 
Blix had five months to find weapons. He found nothing. We’ve had five weeks. Come back to me in 
five months. If we haven’t found any, we will have a credibility problem."30  
 
4. A partisan conclusion 
My allegiance is to the Democratic Party. Its diversity prevents the idiosyncratic and self-aggrandizing 
views of any one demographic group from dominating it. If God doesn't communicate specifically with 
evangelical Christians and the races are equal, the ethnoreligious homogeneity of the Republican Party 
is unlikely to deliver any countervailing benefits. Democratic media also is less supportive of the 
wealthy, who can easily promote dubious ideas favoring their interests. This makes its partisan media 
systematically more reliable, giving it better-informed policies. Since major parties are the best vehicles 
for enacting policy changes, I support Democratic candidates and strive to improve Democratic policies 
through primaries.  
 
The factors favoring Democratic partisanship also favor supporting similar parties in similar political 
environments around the world. India's Congress Party, the current Canadian Liberal Party, and 
arguably the Australian Labor Party are more diverse and less wealthy than their opponents. They can 
be expected to pursue better policies, because their coalition makeup mitigates bias from wealth and 
idiosyncratic ethnoreligious views. These countries' parliamentary systems don't fully share America's 
rigid plurality-rule structure, so many of my conclusions regarding partisan action will hold in a 
weaker form. But if other factors promote an American-style two-party system, the relevance of my 
arguments will rise. 
 
Can Republicans reasonably dismiss this openly partisan argument as an extension of Democratic 
media into an unusually highbrow venue? I've argued that one party's media is likely to be very 
unreliable, and Republicans will think that party is mine. But as you've seen, broad sociological 
observations about the structure of party coalitions and their biases entail my epistemic conclusions. To 
respond, Republicans will need an alternative sociology of the parties, or perhaps an argument that the 
distinctive views of white evangelicals result from a connection to God rather than bias. Accepting the 
sociology that I've presented, and thinking that the distinctive views of dominant ethnoreligious 
groups and the wealthy emerge from biases, I can only conclude that the Democratic Party is more 
worthy of support and that its media is more worthy of belief. I practice the partisanship I preach. 
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